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ASSEMBLING CLASS ACTIONS 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF

 
ABSTRACT 
Five times in the past few years, the Supreme Court has engaged the 
propriety of class actions.
1
 Taken together, these cases revisit certain core 
issues in class action law, all turning on the need and justification for 
grouping individuals as part of a collective entity for litigation purposes. 
When examined from the perspective of legal treatment of individuals as 
part of a collective—assembling the class action, in the terminology of the 
title—three distinct aspects of class organization stand out. First, the 
existence of a litigation entity requires that someone be in charge, and that 
in turn raises the problem of how to ensure the faithfulness of the 
appointed agent. Second, the decision to forge a litigation entity 
necessarily empowers one side of the dispute relative to the other side, and 
that requires some justification. And, finally, even when litigation entities 
exist, class action law must come to terms with the range of individual 
autonomy that should still be recognized, including the ability to contract 
out of collective representation. 
As developed in the difficult recent class action cases, the questions of 
leadership, underwriting, and autonomy help define how modern class 
action practice endeavors to provide equality of treatment and 
predictability in the interaction between the individual insults of aggrieved 
citizens and the undiscriminating consequences of mass society. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his classic work, The Common Law,
2
 Oliver Wendell Holmes set 
about to explain the newly emerging field of tort law. Although the 
principles of compensation for accidents were well-known at the common 
law for centuries, only in the 19th century did these principles become 
recognized as an autonomous and significant branch of legal inquiry. 
Holmes sought to define the world of reasonable care, duties, and 
 
 
  Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. This article was 
initially presented at the 18th Annual Symposium of the Institute for Law and Economic Policy. I am 
appreciative of the comments received there, particularly from Kenneth Feinberg, Robert Klonoff, 
Troy McKenzie, Arthur Miller, and Joseph Sellers. I am indebted as well to Nikolaus Williams for 
research assistance. 
 1. This Article does not take take into account the further additions of the October 2012 Term. 
 2. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
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compensation—what we now understand as the pillars of the tort law—by 
invoking Brown v. Kendall, a noteworthy case written by the highly 
regarded Judge Lemuel Shaw.
3
 Brown v. Kendall involved a classic once-
occurring harm in which a man raising a stick to separate two fighting 
dogs accidentally struck and injured a bystander.
4
 For Holmes, the object 
of the law was to provide incentives toward reasonable care to avoid such 
haphazard events, and then to provide compensation for the harm suffered 
by the unfortunate victim.
5
 
Even in its early exposition, however, tort law had to confront sources 
of harm well removed from the random events of life among strangers. For 
Holmes, this meant that almost as soon as he set out his basic principles, 
he had to anticipate that the events giving rise to claims under tort law 
might have a different origin. In the place of random events, Holmes 
conjectured that the legal treatment of duties and compensation might not 
emerge from such a particularized individual quality: 
If . . . the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply with 
fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, it is obvious that it 
ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at 
least to some extent, and that to do so must at last be the business of 
the court. . . . 
. . . 
Facts do not often exactly repeat themselves in practice; but cases 
with comparatively small variations from each other do.
6
 
Fewer than twenty years later in his The Path of the Law address of 
1897,
7
 Holmes returned to explore the significance of mass repetitive 
injury to flesh out this early insight. In so doing, Holmes introduced a 
deeper account of the object of tort law. This time, his thinking about the 
objectives of the law had changed, and he abandoned his view that the 
organizing principle of the field should be chance interpersonal 
encounters.
8
 In its place, Holmes turned to the burgeoning problem of 
mass society and the apparently inevitable onslaught of injuries thrown off 
by the progress of industry. 
 
 
 3. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
 4. Id. 
 5. HOLMES, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. at 111, 124. 
 7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 8. Id. 
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Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized 
wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like, where the damages might 
be taken to lie where they fell by legal judgment. But the torts with 
which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of 
certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or 
property by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them 
is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by the 
public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of 
liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question how far it is 
desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose 
work it uses.
9
 
Now, all of a sudden, the injured party might still be unknown ahead of 
time, and might have personal or even idiosyncratic reactions to the 
particular injury. But the fact that there would be some individual in this 
circumstance was known ahead of time as a statistical certainty. The 
ensuing harm could no longer be seen as simply a random occurrence 
between the victim and the tortfeasor but was instead a matter of statistical 
probability. For Holmes, this meant that the tort law acquired the qualities 
of insurance and accountancy, fields that were learning to fix the cost of 
accidents within the product market.
10
 And, moving forward, as the 
statistical certainties of injuries in mass society would continue to grow, 
the individual component of any particular claim would be diminished, 
even if we would still want our legal systems to honor the individual 
victim. 
More than a century later the law governing mass harms continues to 
be torn between the conflicting impulses in Holmes’s early rendition of 
tort law. All Western legal systems take the individual to be the core of 
their rules, responsibilities, and rights. This individual focus, however, fits 
uncomfortably with the reality of mass society and poses fundamental 
challenges to these legal systems, which are designed to protect individual 
rights and incentivize the behavior of individuals. This is by no means 
unique to the law of torts or physical harms. Individual consumers, for 
example, have an inherent inability to protect themselves effectively from 
the improper or fraudulent conduct of a distant and usually more 
financially powerful seller.
11
 Traditional contract notions premised on 
 
 
 9. Id. at 467. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, J. 
L. & ECON. 67 (1973). 
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negotiation, a bargained offer and acceptance, and a meeting of the minds 
poorly fit the mass production of goods and services in advanced 
economies. Such limitations have put pressure on legal systems to 
innovate in response to the changing needs of society and to expand the 
traditional, party-bound notion of litigation. 
I will use the core tension in addressing individual rights within the 
aggregate as an organizing principle around which to discuss three areas of 
contemporary class action controversies. In a short period, the Supreme 
Court handed down five significant opinions on class actions
12
 that 
together make the biggest impact on the field since the landmark cases of 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
13
 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
14
 
Taken together, these cases revisit certain core issues in class action law, 
all turning on the need and justification for treating individuals as part of a 
collective entity for litigation purposes. When examined from the 
perspective of legal treatment of individuals as part of a collective—
assembling the class action, in the terminology of the title—three distinct 
aspects of collective organization stand out, and will organize the 
discussion of the new class action jurisprudence. First, the existence of a 
litigation entity requires that someone be in charge, and that in turn raises 
the problem of how to ensure the faithfulness of the appointed agent. 
Second, the decision to forge a litigation entity necessarily empowers one 
side of the dispute relative to the other side, and that realignment of 
litigation prospects requires some justification. And, finally, even when 
litigation entities exist, class action law must still come to terms with the 
range of individual autonomy that should still be recognized, including the 
ability to contract out of collective representation. 
II. REPRESENTATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF AGENCY 
We can think of the modern era of class action law as taking up where 
Holmes’ early insights left off. Beginning at least with Supreme Tribe of 
Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
15
 class actions not only performed the statistical 
blending function that Holmes anticipated, but assumed the ability to bind 
absent parties to the outcome of the litigation. This was a critical move, 
and one that the Court lost no time in acknowledging represented a 
 
 
 12. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
2368 (2011); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 13. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 14. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 15. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
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departure from the presumption in Anglo-American law of the right of 
direct participation as a condition for preclusive enforcement of a 
judgment.
16
 As the Court noted once again in Smith v. Bayer Corp., the 
first of its five recent cases on class action practice, “A court’s judgment 
binds only the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and limited 
exceptions.”17 
Once the Court started down this path to binding absent parties, 
however, the critical question became the nature of the authority to resolve 
contested legal claims on behalf of others. The early representative action 
avoided this problem entirely by allowing parties to join into a collective 
judgment that was secured for them, but otherwise suffer no adverse 
consequences.
18
 For reasons that have been explored extensively in 
modern scholarship,
19
 that form of one-way intervention created immense 
strategic imbalances, offering defendants the prospect of conclusive losses 
but only the briefest of respite in victory. In turn, however, recognizing the 
force of collective resolution meant committing power to an agent to act as 
a controlling surrogate, including for adverse results. 
There simply is no escaping the need for agency in collective actions. 
The American rules of civil procedure anticipate the use of the class action 
only when the action is not capable of being managed as an aggregation of 
individual claims.
20
 The key to an important strain of recent class action 
cases turns on the problem of agency, or as it is sometimes known in our 
field as the “governance problem.”21 Increasingly the case law addressing 
the governmental structures of a class action—doctrinally presented 
through the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequacy of representation—
have come to serve as the touchstone defining whether representative 
litigation can satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
22
 As 
expressed by Professor Owen Fiss, the emerging constitutional standard 
guarantees “not a right of participation, but rather . . . a ‘right of 
 
 
 16. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
 17. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011). 
 18. For a discussion of this, see generally Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class 
Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923 (1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
63 (1988). 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 21. I believe the term is taken from an article of mine. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337. 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (“[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”). 
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representation’: not a day in court but the right to have one’s interest 
adequately represented.”23 
To bind individuals not joined in their individual capacity requires 
imparting some organic quality to the class action. It is of course the case 
that “[t]he law can regard any person either as a member of a group or as a 
legally distinct individual.”24 But the law of class actions appears to 
attempt to do both at once. Absent class plaintiffs are both members of a 
judicially-approved collective body and yet stand apart in terms of actual 
participation and control over the management of that collective body. It is 
for this reason that recent scholarship has begun to gnaw at the 
underdeveloped concept of representative actions and has instead begun to 
view the class action as an “entity” once it has been certified, to use 
Professor David Shapiro’s term.25 
What then is the source of legitimacy for a class action to be deemed 
the proper mechanism to resolve the claims of absent class members? 
History proves to be an unsatisfactory guide for the modern 23(b)(3) class 
action.
26
 The wellspring for modern class action practice, as ably 
chronicled by Professor Stephen Yeazell, reveals that some conception of 
an entity accompanied a significant body of early representative actions.
27
 
One finds early English cases in which the representative entity pre-
existed the class action litigation, as with local governors bringing suit as 
the named representative for their citizenry, the parish being represented 
by the local priest, or a guild being represented by its formal leadership.
28
 
Thus, for example, in one famous case, the mayor of York assumed the 
role of representative agent on behalf of the residents of his city in a 
dispute with citizens of other towns concerning fishing rights in a local 
river.
29
 I have previously written of these cases as constituting organic 
 
 
 23. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 970–71 (1993). 
 24. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the 
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1848, 1851 (1998). 
 25. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 917 (1998). 
 26. A Rule 23(b)(3) class action requires that “the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 27. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 40 (1987). 
 28. Id. (“most medieval group litigation involved groups whose organization antedated the 
lawsuit itself . . . . unlike some modern collective litigation, medieval group litigation did not 
overcome the difficulties of organizing a group for collective action. That task had already been 
done.”). 
 29. Mayor of York v. Pilkington, (1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch.). 
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class actions “so as to highlight the fact that the organizational form of the 
legal action precedes the particular controversy.”30 The critical distinction 
in these cases is that they do not put a court in the uncomfortable position 
of selecting an agent who is somehow “able enough” to speak on behalf of 
others and bind them to the effect of an adverse judgment. A court 
acknowledging that a mayor may speak for his municipality is doing 
nothing more than extending the application of the preexisting political 
power of the office to a corresponding representative claim.
31
 
Searching for pre-existing organic leadership in the modern class 
action setting is likely to have little payoff. One can find isolated cases, 
such as UAW v. Brock,
32
 and read them for the proposition that authority 
established in the political realm on behalf of a dispersed class of 
interested parties should be translatable to the modern class structure.
33
 Or, 
one could perhaps stretch the appointment of a lead plaintiff under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)34 as trying to recreate 
in the realm of the market economy the same conception of pre-existing 
leadership selection. But even these are limited analogies, far removed 
from the comprehensive hierarchies of England of old, and certainly have 
no application in the typical consumer or small-value class action. 
The doctrinal mechanism for avoiding the governance problem was to 
impart class litigation with the quality of a gift rather than an obligation. 
That was the effect of having no capacity to bind anyone other than the 
lead named plaintiff, as all other members of the representative action 
were not parties and could not be bound to the judgment. In the event of a 
plaintiff’s victory, the absent class members could, in effect, join into the 
lawsuit—what in modern parlance would be termed an “opt-in” class 
action—only after the fact and if the result was favorable.35 While this 
procedure avoids binding absent class members to potentially adverse 
consequence, the reciprocal consequences for a defendant are severe. In 
 
 
 30. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 337, 363–64. 
 31. The same principle applies to private associations, rather than public office-holdings, as with 
the ability of the head of a lodge association to represent the interests of the lodge in Lloyd v. Loaring. 
(1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch.). 
 32. 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
 33. In UAW v. Brock the Court allowed the UAW to serve as the class representative for all 
claimed beneficiaries of enhanced unemployment benefits for jobs lost as a result of foreign 
competition. Id. The Court reasoned that the central role of the UAW in agitating politically for the 
claimed benefits made it the presumptive best candidate for the stewardship of the class. Id. at 290. 
 34. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
 35. See Cooper, supra note 18. 
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effect, in any such class litigation, the defendant is able to prevail only as 
to the named plaintiff, but can lose to the entire class. 
Finding mechanisms that confer legitimacy is the challenge of the 
modern, sprawling class action. That legitimacy is challenged under two 
conditions that were relatively absent from historic class action practice: 
first, there is no pre-existing political or organizational vehicle that can 
claim an independent source of authority to speak for the collective; and, 
second, modern conceptions of fairness and finality require that the non-
participating class members be bound to the outcome of the litigation as if 
they were parties. So until the modern class actions with these two 
features, there was no need to police independently the adequacy of 
representation. The basic rule that emerges most directly from the modern 
context is that adequate representation is a prerequisite for binding 
individuals to the outcome of a case, and that this in turn requires that the 
class representatives “fairly represent [the class members] with respect to 
the matters as to which the judgment is subsequently invoked.”36 The key 
issue is the guarantee that the agent be the faithful guardian of the interests 
of the class. The two most important opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
of the past two decades concerning class actions both dealt with the 
problem of class action governance. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor,
37
 and then subsequently in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
38
 the 
Supreme Court confronted efforts to resolve masses of asbestos personal 
injury cases on a class action basis, either using the mechanism of the opt-
out requirements of the damages class action or the compulsory joinder of 
the limited fund class action. Each presented a complex multiparty 
agreement that bound not only the presently injured claimants, but all 
future claimants.
39
 In effect, the two cases tested the ability of class actions 
to provide the type of global resolution of a mass harm that had evaded 
legislative or administrative action. 
Each of the proposed asbestos class action settlements failed, and each 
failed because the required guarantees of faithful representation of the 
absent class members could not be satisfied.
40
 Two facts decided each 
case, despite the formal differences in the types of class actions being 
pursued. First, each class consisted of inherently divided camps that 
sought different allocations of the limited amounts of recovery available to 
 
 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(1)(d) (1982). 
 37. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 38. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 39. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815. 
 40. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626–28; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 854–57. 
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distribute in the settlements. Second, in each case, a condition of settling 
with the present claimants was the ability to cabin and resolve future 
claims by those who did not know they were ill, or did not even know they 
were at risk for asbestos related disease—the problem of unknown future 
claimants being “rationally indifferent” to the terms of the proposed 
settlement, in John Coffee’s formulation.41 In Ortiz, this problem was 
compounded by the differential access to limited insurance coverage for 
some but not all of the claimants.
42
 That too created an internal conflict 
among class members once the proposed settlement blended the 
recoveries, in effect using one group’s privileged access to insurance 
claims to cross-subsidize the recoveries of other claimants. Second, the 
fact that the proposed class counsel had loyalties to the presently injured 
who were their clients further compromised the interests of the future 
claimants, as did the fact that individual cases of present claimants could 
be partially or entirely resolved outside the settlement structure only if the 
whole deal were approved.
43
  
Putting the two parts of the Court’s analysis together properly directs 
attention at the governance structure of the complex entities that have 
emerged in the modern class action. Most central are what Justice 
Ginsburg in Amchem termed the “structural assurance[s]” that provide 
clear guarantees of attorney fidelity to the class, even when allocation 
decisions must be made.
44
 The key is that a supervising court must be 
assured at the threshold stage of the litigation that there are no structural 
allegiances of class counsel that would create incentives to favor one part 
of the class over another, or be biased against seeking the best possible 
return to a defined subset of claims.
45
 Some allocation decisions are 
inescapable because there is an inevitable rough-hewn quality to the relief 
provided by class actions. This can take place overtly, as with the common 
decision to substitute imprecise damage estimates in cases where the 
administrative costs of fine-tuning individual recoveries would overwhelm 
the resources available to the class. But it can just as easily take place 
covertly when lawyers decide to forego some claims, such as those 
arguably barred by a statute of limitations, or decide not to prosecute 
 
 
 41. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 405 (2000). 
 42. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 828. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627. 
 45. Id. 
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individual-based damages that would place the class action beyond the 
managerial control of one court. 
To tie the Amchem/Ortiz concern back to the Court’s most recent cases, 
consider the agency implications of the unanimous ruling in Smith v. 
Bayer Corp.
46
 At immediate issue in Bayer was the effect of the denial of 
class certification in a federal court case on a parallel state court case.
47
 In 
rejecting Bayer’s argument that issue preclusion should foreclose the 
prospect of a subsequent certification of an overlapping class under state 
law for a putative class headed by different class representatives, the Court 
wrote: “we know that [the prior federal case] was not a class action. 
Indeed, the very ruling that Bayer argues ought to be given preclusive 
effect is the District Court's decision that a class could not properly be 
certified.”48 The Court in Bayer held that no non-party to a litigation may 
be bound by the outcome of that litigation, reaffirming the paradoxical 
consequences of non-mutual issue preclusion.
49
 For the Court, that 
principle dictated the conclusion that when a class was not certified, there 
was no agent authorized to bind the putative class members to any 
outcome, even as to the certification decision itself.
50
 The failure to create 
the class as an entity meant simply that there was no appropriate agent 
authorized to speak on behalf of a non-party. 
The flip-side of Bayer, as spelled out in Justice Ginsburg’s extensive 
discussion of the principle of claim preclusion against non-parties in the 
earlier case of Taylor v. Sturgell,
51
 is that the decision to certify does 
empower the collective agent to bind the joined individuals. Where the 
interests of the agent may depart from that of the underlying principals, the 
claimed representation must fail. This core lesson of the authority of the 
agent, invoked to protect the absent class members in Bayer, resurfaced 
shortly afterwards as one of the bases for overturning the certification 
order in the much more high-profile Wal-Mart sex discrimination class: 
[The certification of a mandatory, non-opt out class created] the 
possibility . . . that individual class members’ compensatory-
damages claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power 
 
 
 46. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2380. 
 49. Id. at 2379–82. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 553 U.S. 880 (2008). For an earlier discussion of the limits of claim preclusion outside the 
formal requirements of Rule 23, see Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 183. 
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to hold themselves apart from. . . . That possibility underscores the 
need for plaintiffs with individual monetary claims to decide for 
themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representatives’ or 
go it alone—a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they 
have.
52
 
III. TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD 
Mass society changes the strategic interactions between parties to a 
legal dispute. Going back to the opening example of the random strike of a 
bystander by a man trying to separate fighting dogs, the case of Brown v. 
Kendall
53
 reveals that it is not only the random quality of the event that 
distinguishes that classic tort case from the industrial accidents that would 
later preoccupy Justice Holmes. In any case involving two individuals, the 
law may safely presume not only the self-interestedness of the parties to 
the dispute, but rough parity in the stakes of the dispute.
54
 It is of course 
true that one party may be wealthier than the other, or that one has access 
to better counsel or other resources that may tip the scales of the legal 
dispute. But the parties are equal in that the dispute is over their mutual 
obligation to each other, and nothing more. In the classic account of the 
defining features of a common law legal dispute, the case is party-centric 
and emerges from the autonomous conduct of the parties to the dispute. 
Most centrally, the decision to litigate or settle is party-initiated and party-
controlled, and the boundaries of the dispute are self-contained. This last 
insight is critical because it confines the impact of any judgment to the 
parties themselves. 
Once in the domain of mass interactions, however, the dynamics of 
litigation change. A seller of goods to a dispersed population, a provider of 
uniform services to a broad-ranging clientele, the manufacturer of a 
defective product, the purveyor of tainted pharmaceuticals or 
malfunctioning medical devices—all of these are outside the model of 
individual-to-individual interactions. For the potential defendant in these 
iterated exchanges, even the litigation decision in one case is not confined 
to the claim of the particular claimant. Rather, the disputes quickly 
become “polycentric,” in Lon Fuller’s terminology,55 drawing in the 
 
 
 52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011). 
 53. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
 54. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1282–92 (1976) (setting forth the party-centric assumptions of traditional common law adjudication). 
 55. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978). 
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impact of trial or settlement on other potential claimants, on potential joint 
tortfeasors, on insurers, on reputation effects, on standing in the capital 
markets, and a host of concerns unlikely to be present in the resolution of 
one-off accidents between citizens in a chance encounter. When the effect 
of the expanding law of preclusion is added in, the problem multiplies. 
Every individual case is potentially about the entire universe of affected 
claimants and business partners. 
The resulting asymmetry in stakes between the single-shot plaintiff and 
the repeat-play defendant dooms the small player in litigation, already 
incapacitated by the frequent problem of the low stakes that any individual 
claimant may have serving to discourage suit. Hence the oft-repeated 
observation that in litigation the haves come out ahead.
56
 Repeat play 
demands greater attention to litigation, justifies greater expenditures on the 
prosecution of claims or the preservation of defenses, and forces the 
institutional actor to view even a small lawsuit as a broad threat. Thus 
emerges the centrality of the class action in the limited stakes, negative 
value litigation context. The decision to aggregate creates symmetry in the 
litigation’s stakes, and justifies the cost of prosecution at a level 
commensurate to that of the defence. 
But the decision to expand the economic stakes on the plaintiffs’ side 
of the equation could potentially produce its own distortions, as illustrated 
by Judge Richard Posner’s concern that the excessive stakes in any 
particular class action might coerce settlement through a forced bet-the-
ranch sweepstakes.
57
 The prospects of litigation are not subject to linear 
precision ex ante. Rather predictions of outcomes in litigation necessarily 
move across a range of potential outcomes and the tails of a normal 
distribution in a case with some merit extend from zero recovery at one 
extreme to many multiples of probable liability at the other. A company 
facing that distribution may be risk averse, or simply unable to accept even 
a limited prospect of ruinous liability. As an empirical matter, such 
extraordinary losses are more likely to be realized in repeated single trials 
 
 
 56. Marc Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 57. The extent of the extortion or blackmail effect is, not surprisingly, a subject of dispute. See In 
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) 
(“[Faced with a class action, defendants] may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. 
They will be under intense pressure to settle.”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and 
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); 
Charles Silver, “We're Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 
(2003) (challenging whether in practice class actions actually have the claimed coercive power 
asserted by critics). 
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in the tort system—generally, in the mass personal injury context—in 
which decisions by isolated juries may have a compounding effect on 
liability, particularly if punitive damages are assessed.
58
 Nonetheless, the 
same leverage gained on the plaintiffs’ side by the decision to aggregate 
necessarily raises the pressure and the stakes for the defendant. 
Furthermore, aggregation into a single proceeding also invites the caution 
of Judge Frank Easterbrook about the “central planner” mentality that 
would not allow claims to accrue and the courts to learn from the varied 
experience of multiple trials.
59
 
Viewed in this light, the decision whether or not to certify a class 
action is not simply a procedural device; it is likely to be “outcome 
affective” (to borrow Justice Ginsburg’s terminology),60 if not directly 
outcome determinative. Courts have spoken of the decision not to certify a 
small value case as the “death knell” of the prospects for legal redress 
against an institutional actor,
61
 yet have also spoken of the extortionate 
power of the class action.
62
 If both are true, or partially true, or even 
perceived to be true, how are courts supposed to decide at the threshold 
procedural stage of class certification whether the resulting class is 
indispensible, coercive, just, proper, or any combination in between? 
Some insight comes from two significant cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2011. In the first, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
63
 the Court 
confronted a request to certify a class of millions of women employees of 
the giant Wal-Mart chain on a claim that they were victims of a subjective 
standard of decision-making that resulted in rampant employment 
discrimination. Taken at face value, a class action would certainly have 
been an efficient way of organizing such litigation if indeed women 
collectively had been subject to persistent discriminatory practices. On this 
view, the question of certification transformed a complaint about the 
specific conduct that befell a particular woman, Betty Dukes, or any other 
individual female employee. Once organized around the systemic 
treatment of women at the giant Wal-Mart firm, the class action was 
clearly the superior mechanism to examine a set of institutional practices 
 
 
 58. The effects of potential repeat punitive damages awards are discussed in Samuel Issacharoff, 
“Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1925, 1934 (2002). 
 59. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1105 (2003). 
 60. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996). 
 61. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 62. See supra note 57. 
 63. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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that either promoted discrimination or allowed the prospect of 
discriminatory behavior to fester. 
If indeed the challenge was to the systemic practices of Wal-Mart, the 
collective determination of such events was not only efficient, but seemed 
the only way to make that determination in a consistent and principled 
way. At the same time, the very condition complained of—the subjective 
decision-making—meant that the litigation could aggregate the claims 
only insofar as the focus of litigation was on scrutinizing the company-
wide practices within which such decision-making might occur. The result 
of the litigation would necessarily tip the scales against Wal-Mart because 
a determination of company-wide misbehavior opened the doors to 
potential liability on a mass scale. Certification transformed the case from 
something that happened, at least allegedly, to some women into a broad-
scale investigation of the company as a whole. The very scale of Wal-
Mart’s operations invited a broad inquiry, yet that logic would presumably 
lead every case against Wal-Mart to serve as a class action. At its extreme, 
a customer injured by tripping over an item left on the floor by another 
customer raises questions about the overall practices of inventory 
management across the massive enterprise. 
Nothing in the procedural ruling on certification could provide a 
normative baseline for whether or not such broad aggregation was correct 
in any particular case. On the one hand, Wal-Mart could ill complain that 
its practices were subject to broad-scale challenge given the mass nature of 
the enterprise and the well-known firm penchant for centralizing all 
aspects of store management. At the same time, not every case could raise 
every global issue; sometimes, a slip and fall is really just a slip and fall. 
Some threshold inquiry had to distinguish the occasional from the 
persistent, and the routine from the particular. For the Supreme Court the 
critical lever proved to be the nature of the resolution that could be 
achieved through collective prosecution: could the proposed class 
litigation determine whether any particular woman had been subject to 
discrimination?
64
 As framed by the American Law Institute (“ALI”), the 
question is whether aggregate treatment “materially advances the 
resolution of multiple civil actions by addressing the core of the dispute in 
a manner [likely] . . . to generate significant judicial efficiencies . . . .”65 
Altering the stakes of litigation can neither be the justification for 
consolidating masses of claims, nor for denying their consolidation. 
 
 
 64. See infra note 65. 
 65. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (2010). 
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Rather, the justification must be whether or not the claims are significantly 
mirror images of each other, in effect the market replicas of each other. To 
the extent that the cases fit the model of “if as to one, then as to all,” class 
treatment is justified.
66
 At bottom, the question is whether the conduct 
complained of was directed in an undifferentiated fashion to the normal 
workings of mass markets, or whether there was a retained level of 
individual idiosyncrasy about the subject of the litigation. In Holmes’s 
terms, the issue is whether we are still in the domain of Brown v. Kendall 
or whether we have passed into the world of statistical victimhood.
67
  
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart turned to the work of my late dear 
collaborator, Richard Nagareda, to formalize the inquiry into the collective 
core of the dispute: 
What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a 
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class 
are what have the potential to impede the generation of common 
answers.
68
 
In turn, the procedural considerations on class certification are driven by 
the same inquiry into whether the common elements of the class define the 
issues in dispute: 
When a class seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting all its 
members at once, there is no reason to undertake a case-specific 
inquiry into whether class issues predominate or whether class 
action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute. 
Predominance and superiority are self-evident. But with respect to 
each class member’s individualized claim for money, that is not 
so—which is precisely why (b)(3) requires the judge to make 
findings about predominance and superiority before allowing the 
class.
69
 
 
 
 66. Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 671 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation 
Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 185 (2009) (defining this formulation as the key to optimal 
class action practice). 
 67. See HOLMES, supra note 2. 
 68. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at 2558–59. 
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There is a formal demarcation in Wal-Mart between the different 
aspects of Rule 23, covering the injunctive claims of (b)(2) and the 
damages focus of (b)(3)—in much the way there had been a decade earlier 
in the technical distinctions between (b)(1) and (b)(3) classes in Amchem 
and Ortiz.
70
 But the real demarcation, to use the language of the ALI’s 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation, is between claims that are essentially 
indivisible, as with the common claim for an injunction, and those that are 
fully divisible, as with demands for recompense for the individual 
manifestations of injury.
71
 Ultimately, the class in Wal-Mart could not 
harness a collective resolution of what happened to the various class 
members, nor could it create a unified framework for answering that 
question. The realignment of the balance of litigation incentives that 
almost invariably accompanies class certification could not be justified by 
the traditional indicia of common resolution of the class allegations. Put 
another way, while the modern class action does not have the organic 
feature of the village claims of medieval England, the decision to 
aggregate should reflect some unifying conduct in the defendant’s 
engagement with the collective claimants.  
What does the modern equivalent of the organic class action of old 
look like? An answer can be found in the Court’s important opinion in 
favor of class certification in a second case from the same Term, Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.
72
 By contrast to the subjective 
decisions at issue in Wal-Mart, Halliburton concerned the uniform effects 
of allegedly false disclosures on the market price of Halliburton stock.
73
 
This is the classic form of securities fraud litigation in the United States, 
but it has one critical problem. In order for any plaintiff to prevail in a 
fraud case, the alleged victim must show that she relied on the deception 
in making the financial decision that led to a loss.
74
 Were each individual 
member of the class compelled to come forward to testify about whether 
or not she saw the representations in question and acted because of them, 
then the securities litigation would be as inconclusive as the claims of 
discrimination in Wal-Mart. At most, the class litigation could establish 
what Halliburton did, but could not assign liability as to any given 
 
 
 70. See id. at 2558. 
 71. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 (2010). 
 72. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 73. Id. at 2187. 
 74. Id. at 2183. 
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plaintiff. To follow Professor Nagareda’s formulation, there would be no 
common answers forthcoming.
75
 
This proved not to be a problem. It would be an extremely odd 
outcome to believe that masses of investors in the publicly-traded 
Halliburton stock were each reading the disclosures on their own, and each 
relying independently on the underlying information in making a decision. 
Contracts negotiated one-by-one may work that way, but not rapid-fire 
computer transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, especially in the 
era of automated transactions triggered by complicated price-based 
algorithms.
76
 Rather, the NYSE is a thick and efficient market, one in 
which economic theory tells us that all relevant information is already 
priced into the stock transactions. The transactions at the margin reflect the 
optimism of buyers and the pessimism of sellers, all operating under the 
same presumed universe of access to all relevant market information. 
Under the efficient capital markets hypothesis, material and relevant 
information is integrated across the mass of transactions, and it is the 
market as a whole that relies on such representations, including when the 
underlying information proves to be the product of fraudulent deception.
77
 
In such thick markets, the image of the individual-to-individual bargain 
makes no sense; the contract world had moved well beyond its analogues 
to simple torts such as Brown v. Kendall.
78
 Aggregation clearly altered the 
bargaining power of the parties, and did so to the detriment of the 
defendant Halliburton. But Halliburton had reaped the benefits of raising 
capital on an efficient mass scale and was now being challenged for its 
conduct in the litigation equivalent of an efficient market for functionally 
identical claims. The market treated all buyers and sellers as unified by the 
transactional environment, in ways analogous to the medieval burghers of 
York. 
What then justifies the law presuming to alter the initial putative 
symmetry between the parties? No one can seriously doubt that class 
certification alters the playing field by raising the stakes of the litigation. 
 
 
 75. Cf. Nagareda, supra note 68. 
 76. See Karl Finders, Evolution of Stock Market Technology, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 2, 
2007), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2007/11/02/227883/the-evolution-of-stock-market-te 
chnology.htm (defining algorithmic trading as systems that “buy shares automatically when predefined 
market conditions are met”). 
 77. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (“in an efficient market prices ‘fully reflect’ available information”); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 567 
(1984) (surveying the literature on the efficient capital market hypothesis and identifying the 
mechanisms through which information may be incorporated into the market price). 
 78. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
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Ever since the expansion of issue preclusion in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore,
79
 there has been the risk that the defendant would always have more 
at stake than the plaintiff. Even if there were no formal issue preclusion, 
an adverse judgment invites more litigation against the losing defendant, 
and if issue preclusion attaches, then all the more so. Seemingly, this is a 
one-sided disadvantage for the losing defendant; a litigation version of the 
schoolyard piling-on. But oddly this creates a paradox. The defendant 
always has more at stake in any case, and therefore has an incentive to 
litigate beyond the rational spending of any particular plaintiff. This is 
what underlies the decades old observation of Professor Marc Galanter as 
to why the “haves” come out ahead in litigation—a simple story that those 
who have more at stake will spend more, and so long as there is a positive 
correlation between spending and results, the more incentivized party will 
draw upon greater resources and will in turn obtain better results.
80
 This is 
so predictable that at some point rational plaintiffs would not enter into 
litigation with repeat-play defendants. 
Precisely because it is so obviously true that better incentivized players 
will come out ahead, there must be an evolutionary response or the tort 
system would ultimately prove incapable of addressing the statistically 
certain harms that concerned Holmes. Part of the response is institutional 
with the emergence of repeat-play actors such as insurance companies and 
a specialized bar in small-value claims. The use of the tort law to organize 
claims with predictable characteristics emerged in the mill towns of New 
England, the early use of mass transit such as trolley cars, and other areas 
of statistically certain harms.
81
 Such routine processing has even allowed 
auto accident claims—seemingly the characteristic one-off event—to 
rationalize a claims system that rarely requires litigation.
82
 Another part of 
the evolution of mass claims comes with the growing sophistication and 
resources of the plaintiffs’ bar. While most tort plaintiffs will have only a 
single encounter with a compensable harm, this is not true of the lawyers 
who will handle their claims. The modern plaintiffs' mass harm bar has 
evolved to counter the repeat-play advantage that institutional defendants 
 
 
 79. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 80. Galanter, supra note 56, at 124–25. 
 81. The development of the tort law as an administrative form of handling mass harms is 
analyzed in Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregated Settlement: An 
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004). The authors gratefully 
acknowledge that this paper was first presented to the ILEP conference in 2004. 
 82. Id. at 1603–18 (discussing the role of specialized accident lawyers and insurance companies 
to create a set of administrative grids for handling routine auto accident claims). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] ASSEMBLING CLASS ACTIONS 717 
 
 
 
 
enjoy with regard to any individual claimant.
83
 In response to the 
institutional incentive of defendants to invest beyond the value of any 
single claim, the plaintiffs use techniques ranging from the development of 
efficient referral markets to the creation of ad hoc firms to diversify risk 
and concentrate assets in common question litigation.
84
 
Private aggregation has its limits. The internet and other means of 
modern communication have driven down the costs of contacting potential 
clients and making viable smaller claims in coordinated fashion. But at 
some point, even the reduced transaction costs overwhelm the stakes in 
smaller claims. At that point, the collective gain of the joint endeavor 
cannot overcome the transactional requirement of one-by-one 
representation. And nowhere is this transactional barrier more likely to be 
reached than in the consumer setting in which some mass-produced good 
or service does not live up to its warranted claims. 
It is precisely in cases where there is no independent market for 
effective risk pooling that courts, by virtue of the decision to certify a 
class, become the decisive arbiters of which claims will survive. In taking 
individually unviable claims and giving them collective life, courts are 
realigning the financial interests of the parties and giving positive 
expected value to claims that would otherwise be worthless. Viewed in 
this light, the certification of small-value claims is a state subsidy to 
collective prosecution, requiring only the costs of notice to bind absent 
parties to a joint undertaking.
85
 
Unfortunately, the act of giving value to otherwise valueless claims 
imposes some burden of justification and care. At an earlier time in class 
action law, courts indulged the presumption that the decision to certify a 
class could be handled independently of the merits of the dispute. Under 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
86
 formal class action law forbade any merits 
 
 
 83. I leave to the side the ability of internet communication to facilitate the creation of informal 
organizations among claimants themselves. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, 
Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (2011); Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & 
Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 727 (2008). 
 84. Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1177, 1180–82 (2009). 
 85. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145–46 
(2000) (“The class action rule . . . [gives lawyers] incentives to subsidize access to courts for small 
claimants.”); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847–53 (2002) (pushing further to argue that since only aggregation 
can allow plaintiffs to invest in litigation on an equal basis with defendants, there must be compelled 
joinder of all similarly situated plaintiffs, with no opt-out rights). 
 86. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
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inquiry in determining whether to certify a class.
87
 Rule 23 was a pleading 
rule and the transsubstantive nature of procedure treated the aggregation 
issue as independent of the evaluation of how likely the plaintiffs were to 
succeed on their claims.
88
 Since the purpose of the class action was to 
provide for collective resolution of the common causes of action, there 
was a need for class actions to bind in defeat as well as in victory, a 
purpose that would be compromised if courts were drawn into assessing 
likely success on the merits as a precondition to certification.  
The Eisen rule fared poorly in practice. The consequences of class 
certification required a judicial inquiry into the Rule 23 factors that drew 
the courts more deeply into the factual premises of the case.
89
 Initially, the 
concern was with the propriety of absent plaintiffs being bound by the 
result of an adverse ruling, giving rise to the requirement that courts 
conduct a “rigorous” analysis at the class certification stage.90 Over time, 
however, the argument about prejudice from improper class certification 
was assumed by the defendants. First, the availability of collateral 
challenge to class action settlement legitimately raised concerns about the 
finality of payments to absent class members should judgments or 
settlements be subsequently compromised.
91
 Second, and more 
significantly, defendants claimed that the alteration of stakes caused by 
class actions would compel the risk averse into unmerited settlements.
92
 
Third, courts recognized the tax on judicial resources presented by large-
scale litigation itself required some justification, especially if defects in the 
 
 
 87. Id. at 177. 
 88. See id. 177–78. 
 89. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 cmt. h (2010) (discussing 
certification being a matter of proof not pleading). 
 90. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). For purposes of protecting the 
absent class members, the Court directed the inquiry toward the determination, “whether under the 
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s 
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and 
adequately protected in their absence.” Id. at 157 n.13. 
 91. For an overview of the range of collateral challenges to class action settlements, see Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 
(2008). To a large extent, the risk to a settling defendant is mitigated by the inclusion of a release as 
part of the settlement payment, as with a form acceptance on the back of the check above the signature 
line. 
 92. The Supreme Court implicitly rejected this line of argument in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). Justice Scalia held that class certification 
only multiplied the number of claims, leaving each with the same expected value as if standing alone. 
Id. at 1443. If the expected value of a claim is seen not as a fixed number, but as a probably 
distribution of potential values, the effect of class certification is to magnify the consequences of 
suffering the misfortune of an award at one of the tails of the distribution. 
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class structure would preclude the ability to reach a dispositive resolution 
by trial or settlement. 
Regardless of the source of the claimed prejudice, class action law has 
settled on a fairly robust merits inquiry as part of the class certification 
process. The Eisen approach was repeatedly rejected, and the final blows 
came in the two dominant areas of class action law, securities fraud and 
antitrust. The critical cases were the Second Circuit’s securities decision in 
In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation
93
 and the Third Circuit’s 
antitrust ruling in In re Hydrogen Peroxide.
94
 The Supreme Court itself 
endorsed a more fulsome class certification inquiry in Wal-Mart, ruling 
that district courts are required to resolve any “merits question[s]” bearing 
on class certification, even if the plaintiffs “will surely have to prove 
[those issues] again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”95 
While the law remains unsettled in this area,
96
 the impact of class 
certification on the dynamics of litigation is clearly emerging front and 
center in class action debates. 
IV. CONTRACTING OUT OF THE COLLECTIVE 
In some sense, the world of class action debates is cyclical.
97
 The 
divide between the Supreme Court’s upholding of an aggregate claim in 
Halliburton and the refusal to extend such treatment to the claim of sex 
discrimination in Wal-Mart returns us to our opening concern. American 
law, together with that of the great majority of legal systems, is organized 
around a premise of individual agency. Individual citizens are rights 
holders; they enter into contracts; they possess claims of bodily integrity; 
they rely on expectations of dominion over property. Aggregation of 
claims of legal rights necessarily deprives them of some of the autonomy, 
 
 
 93. 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 94. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 95. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011). 
 96. The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari to review the apparent conflict between 
Eisen and Wal-Mart on the question of the degree to which merits based evidentiary questions need to 
be resolved at the class certification stage. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) 
cert. granted in part, No. 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012). See also PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 cmt. h (2010) (discussing proof issues at class certification). 
 97. In a favorite episode of the television show 30 Rock, Liz Lemon’s loser boyfriend Dennis is 
trying to corner the market in New York for beepers in 2006. Business is predictably bad, but Dennis 
is optimistic. He explains to Liz, in a brilliant bit of absurdity, “technology is cyclical.” Liz is 
distraught and proclaims that, no, technology is not cyclical. 30 Rock: Jack Meets Dennis (NBC 
television broadcast Nov. 30, 2006). But Dennis is right in that some things never go away—though 
maybe not beepers. For an earlier New York-centric account of a similar insight, see YOGI BERRA, 
THE YOGI BOOK 45 (expounding on the phenomenon of “déjà vu all over again”). 
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of the due regard for the Kantian integrity of their status as individuals. 
Mass society is a fact of life, and it is a system of organizing economic 
relations to the benefit of collective society. But it is not the premise of the 
legal system and much of the law of aggregate claims turns ultimately on 
the persuasiveness of the case that there is indeed a basis for the departure 
from individualized premises. 
This then brings us to the third area of contemporary controversy, 
falling squarely in the tension between the individual and the collective. 
The issue arises from the increasing pattern of inserting mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts. At this point in 
the United States, most cell phone contracts, credit card agreements, 
banking contracts, and a host of other mass marketed goods and services 
require consumers to agree to arbitrate all claims that may arise from any 
allegations of improper charges, fraud, or deceptive practices. The same 
pattern is found in employment contracts regarding wage and hour claims, 
discrimination allegations, and other potential repeat offense allegations of 
improper behavior. 
Such arbitration agreements create significant barriers to suit under the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of a 1925 statute, the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”).98 That statute was designed to compel federal courts to 
honor voluntary agreements to resolve disputes outside the court system, 
an important prohibition on the better resourced or more recalcitrant party 
to a business dispute seeking to re-litigate the entire dispute. Of late, mass 
producers of goods and services have inserted these clauses to compel 
individual consumers to seek redress for small value harms in arbitration 
rather than courts and—most centrally—to do so on a one-by-one basis. 
Almost invariably, the arbitration agreements come with a no-class-actions 
prohibition that, if enforced, serves for all intents and purposes as an 
ironclad barrier to privately organized collective challenge to perceived 
improper practices. 
The mandatory arbitration provisions in ordinary consumer contracts 
places in stark relief the tension between the legal system’s presumptive 
commitment to individual autonomy and the compromises inherent in 
mass society. At first glance, contractual exchanges should be given the 
widest berth in terms of respecting the integrity of individual decision-
making. Just as consumers are entrusted to choose among competing cell 
phone offerings, including a bewildering array of payment plans, why 
should they not also be allowed to choose the form of dispute resolution 
 
 
 98. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
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that is most attractive to them? The problem here is two-fold. First, as a 
practical matter, the compelled arbitration provisions are buried in 
mountains of instructional and disclosure forms of little concern to the 
typical consumer.
99
 Most people in the market for a cell phone are seeking 
to acquire, surprisingly, a cell phone; most are not shopping for litigation 
alternatives. In economic terms, a mass market should clear to the efficient 
marginal price in terms of the important features of the relevant market. 
For cell phones, that is likely to be the style of the product, its various 
capabilities, and its price. Beyond that, terms buried in contractual 
boilerplate are unlikely to have any salience to the consumer,
100
 or to be 
the source of an effective market-clearing signal. Second, to the extent that 
consumer protection turns on private enforcement, then the disabling of 
effective aggregate litigation has direct policy implications for the overall 
regulation of consumer affairs.
101
 
In the leading recent case on the enforceability of mandatory 
arbitration, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
102
 the Supreme Court 
threw its weight behind the enforceability of such consumer arbitration 
agreements. For the Court, the overall policy preference for arbitration 
compelled the result and claims of disparity in bargaining power were 
simply too broad to overcome the contractual mandate.
103
 Yet, the Court 
continued to vacillate in two ways. First, the decisive fifth vote of Justice 
Thomas turned on the particular contract to be enforced and the fact that a 
California court was refusing on policy grounds to give credit to a 
Delaware state arrangement, a decision with federalism implications.
104
 
Second, and more significantly, the Court continued its insistence that the 
arbitration procedure be meaningful, not impose costs on a claimant who 
 
 
 99. For example, the average credit card agreement is 5,000 words. Raj Date, Know Before You 
Owe: Credit Cards, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
speeches/know-before-you-owe-credit-cards/. A typical credit card agreement from Bank of America 
is fourteen pages long. Example of Credit Card Agreement for Bank of America Secured MasterCard 
and Visa Accounts, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 30, 2011), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
a/assets/credit-cardagreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_5795.pdf. 
 100. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 91–96 (2012) (identifying the effect of limited capacity to evaluate complicated 
information under the rubric of the salience heuristic in decision-making). 
 101. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005). For a more formal account, see Yeon-Koo Che 
& Kathryn E. Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 4 (2008). 
 102. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 1749–53. 
 104. Id. at 1753–56 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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could otherwise avail herself of the court system, and provide the realistic 
capacity for an individual remedy.
105
 
The tension between individual autonomy and meaningful legal 
accountability is highlighted in the unfortunate case of CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood.
106
 At issue was a commercial operation that targeted 
the most misbegotten of consumers with an offer that only the desperate 
would seek.
107
 CompuCredit offered cards to individuals “with weak credit 
ratings.”108 In the contemporary economic environment, that would 
include those who had suffered home foreclosures or other setbacks that 
made them unable to secure ordinary consumer credit. CompuCredit 
would deliver the opportunity to “rebuild” one’s credit rating by providing 
a credit card with a $300 line of credit, and the claimed opportunity to 
restore creditworthiness through the regular use of the card and timely 
payment of bills.
109
 In exchange for this opportunity, CompuCredit 
charged fees of $257 against the line of credit, benefiting the consumers 
with $43 to “repair” their credit history, and another $257 of debt.110 
Leaving to the side the predatory quality of this exchange, the 
vulnerability of this class of consumers led Congress to pass the Credit 
Repair Organizations Act (“CROA”)111 which offered certain legal 
protections, at least in principle. Foremost among these statutory 
protections was the requirement of prominent disclosure by outfits such as 
CompuCredit that all consumers have a right to sue the company for 
malfeasance.
112
 CompuCredit dutifully carried this disclosure, then 
coupled it with a mandatory arbitration waiver that rendered the statutory 
disclosure meaningless. While individuals had the statutory right to be 
aware of the right to sue, the terms of the credit card agreement included a 
waiver of those same statutory rights, which in turn was disclosed without 
any prominence. The Supreme Court upheld the compelled waiver on the 
ground that the resulting disclosure “may be imprecise, but it is not 
misleading—and certainly not so misleading as to demand, in order to 
avoid that result, reading the statute to contain a guaranteed right it does 
not in fact contain.”113 The result left the most desperate of consumers, 
 
 
 105. Id. at 1751–53. 
 106. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 107. See id. at 668. 
 108. See id. at 676. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-455 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006)). 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(f), (g) (2006). 
 113. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 672. 
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those already in dire straights financially, with the prospect of fending for 
themselves individually when the hoped for credit turnaround became yet 
another source of unsustainable debt.
114
 
The question that the Court declined to entertain in CompuCredit is 
that of defining the point at which apparently individual choice ceases to 
be meaningful. At some point, the fact of entering into a credit card 
contract with a latent condition, such as the loading up of further consumer 
debt, becomes the modern consumer version of Justice Holmes’s insight of 
statistically certain yet individually contingent harms.
115
 If the claimed 
harm is part of an undifferentiated market that operates to select its 
participants along clear criteria, and if the cause of action follows directly 
from the customary operation of that market, then it is hard to justify 
treating the resulting legal claims as isolated individual episodes. The 
insight into the way that markets work in Halliburton may compel similar 
aggregate treatment, even where the markets are not as perfectly 
impersonal and efficient as stock transactions on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
Recent appellate opinions show the unresolved tensions in current 
doctrine. In one case, Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association,
116
 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an arbitration agreement in 
student loan contracts was enforceable and precluded filing suit in court.
117
 
On similar underlying facts, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re 
American Express Merchants’ Litigation118 refused to order arbitration of 
claims of merchants arguing that the terms of use of American Express 
cards constituted an illegal tying arrangement under the federal antitrust 
laws.
119
 What divided the two courts remains the unresolved issue at the 
heart of class action practice. The Ninth Circuit saw the contractual 
bargain to waive arbitration as fundamentally a matter of individual 
choice, and accordingly found that the terms of that contract did not rise to 
the level of “unconscionability” necessary to void the contractual 
obligation.
120
 By contrast, the Second Circuit focused on the effect of 
individual arbitration requirements in terms of the impact of such lone 
 
 
 114. The consumer case is one area in which I share the pessimistic account of Dean Klonoff. See 
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). 
 115. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 116. 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 117. Id. at 964. 
 118. 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert granted sub nom American Express Co v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, No. 12-133. 
 119. Id. at 219. 
 120. Kilgore, 673 F.3d at 964. 
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enforcement obligations on the prospect of vindicating the statutory rights 
underlying the antitrust laws.
121
 Viewed from the vantage point of the 
individual transactor, the Ninth Circuit saw the exchange as well within 
the potential realm of informed individual decision-making. Viewed from 
the competing perspective of the societal interest in ensuring legal 
enforcement in mass markets, the Second Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion. 
At stake in the arbitration cases is not so much the preemptive force of 
a 1925 statute passed long before consumer markets had the standardized 
form they do today. Rather, the issue is the uncertain relation between the 
individualist premise of contract law and the modern world of mass 
enterprise. The latest installment in this area of law came in the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of In re American Express as this Article heads to press. 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court rejected 
the “effective vindication” argument categorically: “the antitrust laws do 
not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every 
claim.”122 Indeed, the Court saw Concepcion as compelling the acceptance 
that the American legal system is not charged with providing a meaningful 
remedy for all claimed breaches of a substantive right, even those 
recognized at law.
123
 This prompted a blistering dissent by Justice Kagan, 
charging that “to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, 
everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled . . . ,” with the 
result being that instead of a cost savings device, “arbitration threatens to 
become more nearly the opposite—a mechanism easily made to block the 
vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from 
liability.”124 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mass society needs mechanisms of mass dispute resolution. It is hardly 
surprising in this day and age that the largest environmental disaster in the 
 
 
 121. American Exp., 667 F.3d at 219. Professor McKenzie argues that one of the advantages 
bankruptcy offers in resolving mass claims is that it starts from the premise of a shared interest among 
all creditors, and does not indulge the individualistic assumptions of the common law. Troy A. 
McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 
(2012). 
 122. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 2013 WL 3064410 at *4 (June 20, 
2013). 
 123. Id. at * 6. 
 124. Id. at * 15. 
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United States,
125
 the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf of 
Mexico, yields the largest proposed class action settlement in American 
history.
126
 While there are innumerable issues regarding the contributing 
causes of the ill-fated British Petroleum drilling venture, and many 
corresponding issues of the extent of the harms caused by the released oil, 
there can be no denying that the core event was a single occurrence crying 
out for collective resolution.
127
 The use of the class action vehicle to settle 
the bulk of private party claims in the BP litigation confirms once again 
the continued centrality of class actions in the mass resolution of collective 
harms. 
At the heart of the many controversies surrounding class action 
litigation in the U.S. is the still unresolved tension between what legal 
claims belong in the category of the individual and what claims belong to 
a world of market relations that has long since transcended even the 
individual victims. As the sweep of industry and commerce expands 
worldwide, these controversies will not abate any time soon. But it is also 
worth remembering that these concerns are not before us for the first time. 
In concluding his discussion of the emergence of tort law in the modern 
era, Oliver Wendell Holmes noted more than a century ago that, 
It might be said that in such cases the chance of a jury finding for 
the defendant is merely a chance, once in a while rather arbitrarily 
interrupting the regular course of recovery, most likely in the case 
 
 
 125. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill (calling 
the spill the “worst environmental disaster”). 
 126. The proposed settlement is split in two: one settlement for economic and property loss, and 
another for medical loss. The settlements received preliminary approval from the Eastern District of 
Louisiana on May 2, 2012. Preliminary Approval Order As to the Proposed Economic and Property 
Damages Class Action Settlement, In Re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 [hereinafter Economic Settlement], available at 
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/05022012Order(EconomicSettlement).pdf; Preliminary 
Approval Order As to the Proposed Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement, In Re Oil Spill by the 
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 [hereinafter 
Medical Settlement], available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/05022012Order(Med 
icalSettlement).pdf. The structure of the settlements is complex. The proposed medical settlement 
would cover certain workers and certain residents of surrounding Gulf areas. Medical Settlement at 5. 
The proposed economic settlement would establish claim categories by geographic location and the 
nature of the loss or damage, including damage to, real estate, vessels, and seafood as well as 
economic loss. Economic Settlement at 5. BP has estimated that claims stemming from the settlements 
will cost $7.8 billion. John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP Spill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling-lawsuit-over-bp-oil-
spill.html. The author serves as counsel to the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee that negotiated the 
proposed settlements. 
 127. Economic Settlement at 2. 
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of an unusually conscientious plaintiff, and therefore better done 
away with. On the other hand, the economic value even of a life to 
the community can be estimated, and no recovery, it may be said, 
ought to go beyond that amount. It is conceivable that some day in 
certain cases we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the 
tariff for life and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.
128
 
Holmes, with characteristic perspicacity, anticipates two critical 
developments in the law’s treatment of mass enterprise activity, one on 
each side of the equation. The first is substantive and introduces the idea 
of enterprise-based strict liability rather than negligence as the touchstone 
for mass hazards. The second, directed to the plaintiffs in such cases, is to 
rationalize the compensation away from the unpredictability and cost of 
individual jury determinations. The reference to the Leges Barbarorum, 
the Germanic formalistic codification of Roman Law during the Middle 
Ages, is to the use of a schedule of damages as the basis for compensating 
the inevitable injuries attending to mass society. 
Our inherited legal traditions seek to honor the individual as the heart 
of our system of duties and responsibilities. But by the time we get to 
something like the proposed BP class action settlement, we have moved 
far in the direction that Holmes anticipated more than a century ago. 
Under the Oil Pollution Act, the discharge of oil is statutorily entrusted to 
a strict liability regime,
129
 and what the parties negotiated is an 
extraordinarily detailed compensatory code for economic and medical 
harms.
130
 We no longer seek to write out a comprehensive formula of 
harms ahead of time, in the fashion of the medieval application of Roman 
law, but our class action practice endeavors to provide equality of 
treatment and predictability in the interaction between the individual 
insults of aggrieved citizens and the undiscriminating consequences of 
 
 
 128. Holmes, supra note 7, at 467. 
 129. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-380. 
 130. See Economic Settlement, supra note 126, and Medical Settlement, supra note 126. Indeed, 
the class action remains the best mechanism for overseeing the equitable resolution of mass disputes. 
See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 143–51 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] ASSEMBLING CLASS ACTIONS 727 
 
 
 
 
mass society.
131
 It is not an easy line to walk. But the tension is hardly 
novel. 
 
 
 131. As well captured by Judge Anthony Scirica of the Third Circuit: 
The class action device and the concept of the private attorney general are powerful 
instruments of social and economic policy. Despite inherent tensions, they have proven 
efficacious in resolving mass claims when courts have insisted on structural, procedural, and 
substantive fairness. Among the goals are redress of injuries, procedural due process, 
efficiency, horizontal equity among injured claimants, and finality. 
Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring). 
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